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Abstract 
A large volume of research has investigated consequences of physical and health impairments with 
respect to labor force attachments and earnings of persons with disabilities. Many of these studies are 
based on data sources in which individual disability status is self-reported. Considerably less attention 
has been devoted to factors that determine self-reported disability. The contribution of this paper is in 
its distinction between two aspects of endogenous selection in the transition from self-declared 
nondisability to disability status. On one hand, measured earnings and income might exert a direct 
effect on the individual’s propensity to report disability. On the other hand, some individuals possess 
unmeasured traits that might simultaneously affect their earnings and their propensity to report a 
disability. Based on samples of individuals from the U.S. Current Population Survey at two points in 
time, and using individuals who initially do not report a disability, this study looks for an explicit role 
of earnings per se in the reporting decision. Second, it examines whether transitions to disability 
between the two periods occur in the presence of correlation between unmeasured factors present in 
both earnings during the first period and the subsequent decision to report a disability.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, the United States has witnessed a marked increase in the proportion of the adult 
population reporting impairments or disabilities that limit the capacity for work. The importance of this 
phenomenon arises from well-known economic consequences of disabilities. Persons who possess 
physical or health impairments tend to experience outcomes in the labor force that fall well below those 
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of the nondisabled population. Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that, among men aged 
16 to 64, the labor force participation rate in 2015 among those who report themselves as disabled was 
0.31, compared to 0.76 among nondisabled men. For the subset of labor force participants who were 
employed, the proportion working full time was 0.71 for the disabled, compared to 0.83 for the 
nondisabled. 
Data from the American Community Survey indicate a disability-associated discrepancy in earnings as 
well, even for workers who are strongly attached to the labor force. For non-institutionalized persons 
aged 21 to 64 who were employed full time and full year in 2015, median annual earnings for disabled 
individuals were $40,100, compared to $45,100 for nondisabled persons. 
These labor market outcomes in turn have important implications for public policy. In the United States, 
publicly funded disability benefits are administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA). The 
SSA reports that in 2015 approximately 8.9 million disabled workers received average monthly benefits 
of $1,168 through the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program. This represents an increase 
from the preceding decade, having grown from 6.5 million beneficiaries receiving average monthly 
benefits of $938. Available evidence indicates that in recent years there has been some change in the 
distribution of SSDI benefit recipients in the direction of individuals who are approaching conventional 
retirement ages. In 1996, the proportion of all SSDI recipients aged 55 to 59 was 0.19. By 2005, that 
proportion increased to 0.22, and in 2015 it increased again to 0.25. 
In addition, in 2015 another 8.2 million low-income disabled people with little work history received 
approximately $516 per month in through the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. That 
reflects an increase from 2010, when 7.7 million beneficiaries received an average of $500 per month. 
During the 1980’s, the SSDI and SSI programs experienced changes that loosened eligibility 
requirements and increased generosity of benefits. These changes have attracted attention from 
researchers and policy analysts. Evidence by Autor and Duggan (2003), Bound and Waidman (1992), 
and Goodman and Waidman (2003) indicates that the result was an increase in the proportion of men 
who report work limitations and a concomitant decrease in employment of men with disabilities.  
Another area of interest among researchers has been the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
in particular ADA’s consequences regarding labor market outcomes for the disabled. The principal 
focus of attention has been on employment and earnings (See, for example, Acemoglu & Angrist, 2001; 
DeLeire, 2000; Kruse & Schur, 2003; Hotchkiss, 2003; Houtenville & Daly, 2003; Zimmer, 2008). The 
general conclusion of the research is by now well established: in the post-ADA period, employment of 
disabled persons has declined and wages of those who do work have either declined or remained 
stagnant relative to their nondisabled counterparts. 
In view of the significance of this issue for public policy, a question that deserves more attention is the 
decision by individuals to respond to formal surveys reporting themselves as possessing a physical or 
health disability that limits or impairs their capacity for work. The importance of this research derives 
from that fact that most existing research rests in general on an approach that compares outcomes for 
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the existing disabled population relative to those who are not disabled. This study is concerned with the 
possible extent to which this partition of the population might be characterized by some degree of self 
selection. It views the decision to self-report disability as a result of individual choice. This is distinct 
from the onset of disability itself, which is likely the result of illness, accidents, or other sources that 
affect the individual’s physical or mental well-being. Since those who make the decision to report a 
disability are a self selected subset of the population, they might differ in many respects from 
individuals who choose not to report. For example, reporters and non-reporters might differ in their 
earnings or income, which affects their respective eligibilities for public support. In addition, even 
among individuals who appear similar in measured traits such as age, education, and earnings, there are 
potential differences in latent attributes that affect the decision by some of them to report disabilities. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II provides background for this research. 
Section III defines the concept of self selection and establishes an econometric framework in which the 
essential hypotheses can be tested. Section IV profiles the data set and model specification. Results of 
estimation are presented in Section V, while Section VI concludes and summarizes. 
 
2. Background 
There is a large literature addressing labor market outcomes for workers with disabilities. Interested 
readers may refer, for example, to collections of papers published by Berkowitz and Hill (1989), Rupp 
and Stapleton (1998), Stapleton and Burkhauser (2003), and Hotchkiss (2003). A common empirical 
approach is to utilize data sources such as the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), 
Current Population Survey (CPS), or the American Community Survey (ACS) to analyze employment 
and earnings of existing disabled workers. It is common to classify as disabled individuals who report 
that they possess physical or health impairments that limit or prevent normal work activity. The general 
finding that arises from this research, as noted in Section I, is that disabled workers continue to 
experience adverse outcomes in employment and wages, even twenty five years after passage of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. 
Some researchers have recognized the possibility that self-reported health status might be endogenous 
to those outcomes. See, for example, Campolieti (2002, pp. 407-408); Beegle and Stock (2003, p. 843); 
Hollenbeck and Kimmel (2008, p. 713). Yet the literature has focused more on labor market 
consequences for (currently) disabled workers and relatively less on the self-reporting decision itself. 
Exceptions include Beegle and Stock (2003); Chirikos and Nestel (1984); Chirikos (1986); Campiolieti 
(2002, Table 1); Hollenbeck and Kimmel (2008, Table 2); and Rivera (2001). Campolieti (2002) 
estimates the impact of disability on labor force participation of Canadian men. As part of that research, 
and using a cross section sample of men aged 45 to 64 from the 1994-1995 wave of the Canadian 
National Health Survey, she reports estimates of a linear probability model of self-reported disability 
status. Explanatory variables include several self-assessed health characteristics and individual 
characteristics such as age, education, and household size. However, her model does not include 
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earnings or income as an explanatory variable. Rivera (2001) estimates an ordered probit model of 
self-reported health based on a cross section of individuals from the 1993 wave of the Spanish National 
Health Survey. The dependent variable encompasses five categories of health, and the model purports 
to estimate the impact of public health expenditures on those health outcomes. The model includes as 
explanatory variables several background and demographic characteristics, as well as variables 
measuring public health expenditures in the individual’s region of residence, yet it excludes measures 
of individuals’ earnings or income. Beegle and Stock (2003) use a linear probability model for 
individual self-reports of disability based on U.S. Census data from 1970, 1980, and 1990. The 
specification includes individual characteristics such as age, education, and household size. In addition, 
it includes indicators of diagnosed medical conditions thought to be associated with disability. The 
model does not, however, allow individuals’ earnings to directly affect their reported disability status. 
Chirikos and Nestel (1984) use cross section samples of mature men and women from the 1976 and 
1977 waves of the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth to estimate logit models of self-reported 
disability status. They implicitly recognize the potential endogeneity of individuals’ hourly earnings, 
which they address by specifying the model to include estimated wages from a first step auxiliary 
regression. Their estimates indicate that individuals with higher expected wages are significantly less 
likely to report disabilities. A similar approach is used by Chirikos (1986), based on cross sectional data 
from the 1978 Social Security Administration Survey. His results likewise indicate a reduced 
propensity to report disabilities as expected wages increase. 
Additional papers that include models of reported work limitation status are Kreider (1999) and Webber 
and Bjelland (2015). Both studies focus on simultaneous estimation of reported limitation and labor 
force participation. Again, unlike our approach, to be described in Section III, their disability-reporting 
models are reduced forms and do not incorporate individuals’ wage earnings as endogenous 
determinants of the reporting decision.  
Another feature that distinguishes the literature is the tendency to utilize data on individuals who report 
themselves as disabled at the time the respective surveys are conducted. Less attention is devoted to 
individuals who are initially nondisabled and subsequently transition to disabled status in a succeeding 
time period. A recent exception is Lechner and Vasquez-Alvarez (2011). Using the 1984-2002 waves of 
the German Socioeconomic Panel, they construct successive four year panels for each individual, in 
which by construction of the sample, individuals are not disabled in the first period and then 
subsequently transition to disability. Their principal focus is on the onset of disability and its impact on 
several outcomes, including employment and earnings. Their basis of comparison, utilizing propensity 
score matching, is the set of individuals who remain nondisabled for the entire duration of the four year 
panels. Based on this matching of disabled and nondisabled persons, they find that the transition to 
disability (rather than existing disability status) is associated with a significant reduction in the 
probability of employment. 
It is these two aspects of the literature, determinants of self-reported disability and a focus on 
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transitions into disability, which deserve more attention. The general need for additional research, 
which motivates this paper, is noted by Kruse and Schur (2003, p. 62): 
“This highlights a need for further research on what leads people to say they have a work-limiting or 
work-preventing disability in order to gain a better understanding of how labor market conditions, 
public policies, and employer accommodations may affect these self-reports and employment prospects 
of people with impairments and activity restrictions”. 
Accordingly, this study has two principal objectives. First, it recognizes that self-reporting is by 
definition a phenomenon that takes place before or concurrent with the individual’s potential access to 
legally established consequences of disability, such as rights to workplace accommodation under the 
ADA or public support programs such as SSDI or SSI. However, as noted above, it has been common 
in the literature to analyze the labor market effects of disabilities for reporting themselves as disabled at 
the time they are surveyed. This leaves unanswered the important question concerning determinants of 
the transition to self-reported disability. 
Second, this study incorporates two potential dimensions of self selection. Following Heckman (1979), 
the traditional definition is based on unmeasured traits of self-reported disabled individuals. Positive 
selection is present if individuals who possess latent tendencies to self-report are characterized by 
unmeasured attributes that result in higher earnings; negative selection is present when positive 
propensities to self-report are associated with negative latent earnings attributes. At the same time, 
however, selection might be related to measured earnings. In this framework, self-reporters are 
positively selected if they exhibit higher earnings before they report disabilities. Negative selection 
occurs if self-reporters originate from the lowest earners. This study incorporates both aspects of self 
selection in the context of a single model. It permits testable hypotheses about selection based on both 
observed earnings and unmeasured attributes of potential self-reporters. 
 
3. Econometric Framework for Self Selection 
To clarify ideas, we establish a definition of self selection and an econometric framework that permits 
tests of the appropriate hypotheses. To capture the transition to self-reported disability, we envision a 
population of initially employed males observed at consecutive points in time. During the first period, 
each individual is not impaired by a physical or health disability that limits his capacity for 
employment. For individual i, earnings in the first period are expressed as 
iii xy                                 (1) 
where iy  denotes earnings, ix  is a vector of explanatory variables, and   is a conformable vector 
of unknown coefficients. The random error term   is normally distributed with zero mean and 
variance 2 . 
By the second period, the individual reports either that he is or is not impaired by a work-limiting 
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disability. We denote these choices as 1id  and 0id , respectively. At the time his disability 
status is reported, his anticipated earnings for the second period are denoted by 
 ii yy i ,                              (2) 
where i  represents a latent adjustment and is perceived by the individual as potential disturbance to 
his earnings in the second period. Self selection in the reporting decision is summarized as the 
difference between individuals’ expected earnings and their (counterfactual) expected earnings if they 
do not report a disability:  
)0|()1|()0|()1|(  iiiiiiii dEdEdyEdyE  . 
Thus the essence of latent self selection is that individuals who report work-limiting disabilities are 
characterized by unmeasured traits that become manifest in their earnings anticipations formed during 
the first period. It might be, for example, that individuals who anticipate that they will report 
disabilities in the second period are characterized by latent characteristics to alter their respective 
investments in human capital, such as training or acquisition of new work experience, during the initial 
earnings period. In that case the latent term in (2) would be negative. On the other hand, individuals 
who anticipate reported disabilities might be motivated to augment their earnings during the 
nondisabled period, perhaps in anticipation of decreased earning capacity in the second period. In that 
case the latent adjustment to expected second-period earnings would be positive. 
At the same time, however, there is reason to believe that self selection might also arise directly from 
sources that are measurable, in particular earnings in the first period. Earnings in the initial period 
might be significant in explaining costs or benefits associated with disability. On one hand, individuals 
who earn high wages are likely to be relatively productive, which implies a commensurately larger 
opportunity cost associated with work limitations arising from disability. In addition, since disability is 
often associated with costly physical adaptations and accommodations to activities of daily living, 
high-earning individuals are better able to finance those challenges, and self-reported disability will 
again be associated with higher earnings. On the other hand, the low-earning population might 
disproportionately consist of workers whose wage-based opportunity costs of reduced work activity are 
relatively low, and for whom the income replacement values of public and private benefits for disability 
are relatively high. In those cases the propensity to report disabilities would be negatively related to 
earnings. Both hypotheses are plausible, and resolution of their respective merits is an empirical issue. 
These considerations suggest an econometric framework that encompasses selection into self-reported 
disability on the basis of measured as well as unmeasured traits. We address that in the context of a two 
equation model.7 Denote *id as the individual’s latent propensity to self-report a work limiting 
disability (for brevity, hereafter “report”). He chooses to report if 0* id ; otherwise he does not 
report during the second period. Reproducing equation (1), the joint model of earnings and the report 
decision is given by  
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iii xy                                 (3) 
 iiii zyd  *                            (4) 
where iz  is a vector of measured characteristics,   is a conformable vector of coefficient 
parameters and i  is the idiosyncratic error term as postulated in equation (2). All variables with the 
exception of the reporting outcome are measured in the initial period; thus our approach is to compel 
self selection, if it exists, to manifest itself in the decision to report and not after the fact. 
The reporting propensity is not observed. Instead we observe a dichotomous variable  
1id  if 0* id , 
0id  if 0* id . 
The error terms i  and i  are assumed to posses a bivariate normal distribution with zero means, 
respective variances 2  and 1, and covariance parameter  . 
This model contains two parameters that are informative about self selection. In (3), the coefficient   
captures selection based on measured earnings. If   > 0, then individuals who experience higher 
earnings, holding other factors constant, are more prone to report disabilities than those with lower 
earnings. This reflects positive selection on earnings; if   < 0, negative selection on earnings is 
present.  
The covariance parameter   reflects the presence of latent attributes. If 0 , then individuals 
who are high earners in the initial period due to unobserved traits likewise possess unobserved 
characteristics that make them more likely to report disabilities. If 0 , negative selection is 
present: persons with latent earnings advantages are prone to refrain from reporting disabilities. The 
two phenomena are not mutually exclusive, and resolution of their respective roles is the principal 
objective of the empirical analysis in Section V.  
Our empirical strategy is to estimate equations (1) and (3) jointly by the method of maximum 
likelihood after reformulating the model as a pair of reduced form equations. Substituting (1) into (3) 
yields a reduced form equation for the decision to self-report:  
 iiii zxd  ~*                            (5) 
where iii  ~ . 
Under the assumptions of the model, the error terms i  and i~  are distributed as bivariate normal 
with zero means, respective variances  
2)(  V  
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12)~( 22   V  
and covariance    2)~,(Cov . 
The sample is partitioned into individuals who report disabilities in the second period ( 1id ) and 
those who do not ( 0id ). For individual i, the univariate density of the error term in equation (1) is 
given by  


 
 

)(1)( iii
xy
g                         (6) 
where   denotes the density function of a standard normal distribution. For the population of 
self-reporters, we derive the conditional density: 
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df           (5) 
}{A , 
where   denotes the cumulative distribution function associated with the standard normal 
distribution and A denotes the argument in brackets. 
For the population of those who do not report disabilities, the conditional density analogous to (5) is 
given by }.{1)0;|~( Adf iii   Accordingly, the likelihood function for the entire 
sample, consisting of D individuals reporting disabilities and N individuals who are nondisabled, is 
given by  
)()0;|~()()1;|~( 11 iiii
N
iiiii
D
i gdfgdfL              (6) 
In Section V we use the sample data to maximize the likelihood function in order to obtain estimates of 
(1) and (3) along the associated variance and covariance parameters. 
As noted above, the research objective advanced here emphasizes self selection based on both observed 
and unobserved factors. This has appeared in areas of research outside the disability literature. For 
example, the role of observable and unobservable factors in the process of endogenous selection has 
been discussed in the literature on program evaluation. Studies by economists in that literature have 
been concerned with labor market programs in which individuals who lack job skills or stable work 
histories receive training or other “treatments” intended to strengthen their employment prospects. 
Early examples and extensions in this area include Ashenfelter (1978), Barnow, Cain and Goldberger 
(1980), and Heckman and Hotz (1989). Our model is a variation of this idea, entailing selection into 
self-reported disability status directly as a result of observed earnings and indirectly on the basis of 
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covariation between latent earnings and the propensity to report disabilities. 
As described in this section, the structural model necessitates a sample of employed males during the 
first period. Consequently this design precludes investigation of the effects of joblessness or job loss on 
self-reported disability. Examples of research addressing that question include Hotchkiss (2003, 2004). 
In addition, we restrict the analysis to males because of the generally higher labor force attachments of 
men. Inclusion of females would require addressing the familiar problem of nonrandom selection of 
females into employment (Heckman, 1979), which is beyond the scope of the immediate question in 
this paper. 
 
4. Data and Model Specification  
Estimation of the model is based on data from the United States Current Population Survey (CPS) for 
2002 through 2010. The annual March CPS contains data from approximately 50,000 U.S. households. 
Sample households in the CPS are interviewed for four consecutive months. They are then omitted 
from the survey for eight months, after which they return for another four month period. Thus, although 
the core content of the CPS is essentially cross sectional, the rotating sampling scheme allows us to 
exploit the outgoing rotation groups for the purpose of accessing two adjacent years of data for each 
individual. This is necessary for estimation of the model represented in Section III, since it purports to 
explain the individual’s change in reported disability status, if any, in year t based on his earnings, 
along with exogenous controls, in year t - 1. Thus, for the first outgoing rotation group, the base year is 
2002 and the year for potential reported disability is 2003. For this group the only variable extracted 
from the 2003 CPS is di in equation (6), the dichotomous indicator denoting reported disability. Since, 
by sample design, all individuals are nondisabled in year t - 1, the outcome di = 1 identifies a transition 
from nondisabled to disabled status. All other variables in the model are taken from the base year.  
Similarly, for the second outgoing rotation group, the base year is 2003 and the outcome year is 2004, 
and so on, up to the final group, with base year 2009 and outcome year 2010. As noted above, the total 
sample consists of male salary and wage earners, all of whom self-report themselves as nondisabled in 
their respective base years, are not self employed and not in the armed forces. The total sample for all 
cohorts consists of 15,640 men, of whom 454 became newly disabled after their respective base years. 
Since newly reported disability is a relatively rare event at the individual level for any two adjacent 
years, we pooled the eight outgoing rotation groups in order to generate sufficient variation in the 
outcome variable. Accordingly, as described below, the model adjusts the earnings variable over time to 
reflect constant (Year 2000) dollars and includes a set of year indicators in the disability equation to 
account for trends in disability over time.  
In addition to individual earnings and disability outcomes, the data file contains background 
information for each individual, including age, education, race, disability status, union membership, 
and occupation, all of which are included in the earnings equation. In addition, included exclusively in 
the outcome equation are household income other than earnings of the individual, and indicators for 
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presence of young children in the household, home ownership, and the proportion of the population 
enrolled in Medicaid for the state in which the individual resides. Inclusion of the latter variable is due 
to the fact that individuals receiving SSDI benefits are eligible for the Medicaid program after two 
years of benefit receipt. In the empirical analysis, the earnings variable is expressed as a natural 
logarithm.  
We restrict the sample to men who are married with spouse present in the initial period. To include 
single men in the sample creates the task of modelling the joint occurrence of marital status and 
disability incidence, which substantially extends the scope of the model described in Section III. In 
addition, focusing on married men is of interest in its own right. In households with married men who 
are wage and salary earners, those men are often significant if not the predominant sources of income 
in the family. Consequently, in cases where they transition to disability, the implications are likely to be 
significant, both for the well-being of families and for considerations of public policy. 
As noted above, since the sample combines outgoing rotation groups from 2002-2003 through 
2009-2010, the model includes dummy variables in the disability outcome equation as controls for the 
individual cohorts. The cohort effects include pervasive macroeconomic and societal changes that 
potentially affected onsets of reported disability during the sample period. 
In the empirical estimates, we estimate the model for two alternative measures of income, i.e., the 
variable denoted y  in equations (1) and (3). In the first version, we use annual earnings from wages 
and salaries. The second version expands this concept to annual personal income, which adds to wage 
earnings any income accruing to the individual in the form of interest, dividends, or other forms of 
investment income. In addition, we estimate the model for alternative indicators of transitions to 
disability, the variable denoted d  in the likelihood function. In the first version, the indicator d is 
assigned a value of one for individuals who report themselves as nondisabled in period t-1 and disabled 
in period t, as described in the previous section. The alternative version assigns the indicator a value of 
one if the individual reports zero income from SSDI in period t-1 and positive SSDI income in period t, 
and zero if reported SSDI income is zero in both periods. The upshot of these extensions is that we 
report estimates for four versions of the model, corresponding respectively to combinations of the two 
measures of individual income and two indicators of the disability transition. 
 
5. Results of Estimation 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Variable definitions and sample means are presented in Table 1, which partitions the sample by 
disability outcome. The sample means reveal that men who are not disabled in year t (2002, …, 2009) 
and who report disabilities by year t are slightly older and have lower earnings and personal incomes in 
the initial year than those who remain nondisabled. They also report lower levels of home ownership 
and other family income. The evidence in Table I needs to be seen with caution, however, since it is 
based on a comparison of simple averages. The remainder of this section examines that issue in the 
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multivariate context of equations (1) and (4). 
 
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Sample Means: N = 15,640 
Variable Definition Reported Nondisabled 
All Years  
Reported Disabled All 
Years 
PER_INC (t=1) Individual’s annual personal income ($): 
initial year (constant Year 2000 dollars) 
$62,412  $53,471 
EARN (t=1) Individual’s annual labor earnings ($): 
initial year (constant Year 2000 dollars) 
 $54,237  $47,196 
OTH_INC Total family income other than 
individual ($): initial year (2000 dollars) 
$91,636 $80,479 
AGE Age   44.7 45.65  
EDUC Years education  13.77 13.29  
UNION = 1 if individual was member of labor 
union 
= 0 otherwise. 
0.15  
 
0.11  
PROF_OCC = 1 if individual’s occupation is 
professional or managerial; 
= 0 otherwise. 
0.21 
0.22 
 
BLACK =1 black; 
=0 if white 
0.07 0.10  
CHILD≤6 =1 if children aged 6 years or younger 
are present in household; 
=0 otherwise 
 
0.27 
 
 
0.27  
 
MED_PROP Proportion of state population receiving 
Medicaid 
0.29  0.31  
OWN_HOME =1 if individual owns home outright or 
through mortgage; 
=0 otherwise 
0.90  0.86 
 
5.2 Principal Estimates: Self-Reported Disability Based on Wage Earnings 
Table II presents maximum likelihood estimates of the model. This version defines income as annual 
wage earnings and the disability transition based on self-reported disability. Estimates of the remaining 
versions of the model, as described in Section IV above, are presented respectively in abbreviated form 
in Tables III and IV. 
 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/rem               Research in Economics and Management               Vol. 3, No. 1, 2018 
36 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Table 2. Maximum Likelihood Estimates: N = 15,640 
Variable  Equation (1): 
Log Annual Wage Earnings  
Equation (3): 
Reported Disability 
CONSTANT 7.685 (44.71) 2.579 (1.91) 
EDUC 0.084 (45.52) 0.030 (2.07) 
 
AGE 0.080 (10.37) 0.012 (4.30) 
AGESQ/100 - 0.087 (10.07)   
BLACK - 0.196 (8.64)  
PROF_OCC 0.287 (19.94)   
UNION  - 0.104 (1.75) 
OTH_INC   - 0.001 (0.80)  
MED_PROP   0.857 (4.09) 
CHILD≤6    0.078 (1.45)  
OWN_HOME   - 0.096 (1.54)  
YEAR1=2003   - 0.400 (5.89)  
YEAR1=2004   - 0.432 (5.72)  
YEAR1=2005   - 0.339 (4.85)  
YEAR1=2006   - 0.426 (5.74)  
YEAR1=2007  - 0.410 (5.66)  
YEAR1=2008  - 0.499 (6.52) 
YEAR1=2009  - 0.453 (6.07) 
Error Covariance: ˆ   0.220 (3.09) 
EARN (t=1): ˆ   - 0.488 (3.61) 
 
The first column in Table 2 shows estimated coefficients for the earnings equation in year 1 for each 
two-year period. The dependent variable is (log) annual earnings from wages. Column two presents 
probit estimates for self-reported disability in year 2. Figures in parentheses are absolute t statistics, 
testing the null hypotheses that the corresponding population coefficients are zero. 
The estimates in column one are consistent with commonly reported research on earnings, indicating 
that earnings increase with years of formal education, with an annual return in excess of approximately 
eight percent. The race coefficient indicates an approximate 20 percent reduction in wage earnings 
among black men relative to whites. The age profile is concave, and individuals in professional or 
managerial occupations are significantly higher earners than those in other occupations.  
Column two presents probit estimates of the disability equation. Reported disability appears to increase 
with age. Holding age constant, men who are relatively highly educated are significantly more likely to 
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report disabilities. Individuals residing in states with relatively high proportions of participants in the 
Medicaid program are more likely to report disabilities. That is perhaps indicative of the within-state 
efficacy of the Medicaid program itself; in addition, the high Medicaid participation might reflect state 
level generosity in other assistance available for persons with disabilities. Reported disability is 
diminished among union workers and home owners, although neither of the latter estimates is strongly 
significant. Presence of young children in the household is positive but not significant, and household 
income other than the individual’s wage earnings is not significant. The dummy variables for years 
2003-2009 indicate reported disabilities appear to have diminished in the years following 2002, the 
reference period. 
The principal parameters of interest are the coefficient of earnings in the disability equation,  , and 
the covariance between random error terms in equations (1) and (4),  . The estimates in Table II 
(ˆ = - 0.488,  = 0.220) indicate that the parameters are opposite in sign and strongly significant. 
The earnings coefficient confirms that earnings tend to reduce the incidence of reported disability. The 
covariance parameter suggests positive latent selection into reported disability: after controlling for 
measured earnings and other background attributes, men who possess unobserved positive earnings 
attributes are characterized by unmeasured propensities to report disability.  
The positive covariance invites discussion. While we know of no previous attempts in the literature to 
estimate this parameter in the context of a model that explicitly controls for measured earnings, some 
authors have suggested what is equivalent to a positive covariance. Blanck, Schwochau, and Song 
(2003, p. 322), for example, point out that workers with disabilities face substantial obstacles in their 
requests for workplace accommodations under the ADA. They must simultaneously establish that they 
are limited in their work capacities but nonetheless qualified for the work in question. In addition, as 
Goodman and Waidman (2003, p. 357) point out, to the extent that high earnings are associated with 
greater education attainments, these workers are also more likely to be denied SSDI benefits, thus 
necessitating participation in the labor force. Once employed, and in order to receive accommodations, 
they are as a matter of course strongly incentivized to report themselves as disabled. In the population 
of working people, from which the sample for this study is drawn, it is therefore plausible that these 
self-reporting individuals possess unmeasured traits that are, ceteris paribus, associated with higher 
earnings.  
Studies that focus on the simultaneous occurrence of reported work limitations and labor force 
participation include Kreider (1999) and Webber and Bjelland (2015). In both cases, their models 
attempt to control for correlation between unobserved factors in the two equations. Webber and 
Bjelland (2015) report positive correlations for respective samples of men. Krieder (1999), on the other 
hand, obtains negative correlations for samples again partitioned by gender, although his estimates do 
not significantly differ from zero. 
Moreover, working individuals who possess latent strengths in earnings will tend to be in advantageous 
bargaining positions with their employers with respect to ADA accommodations. Characterized by high 
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Marginal Revenue Products (MRP) relative to their nonworking disabled counterparts, they might 
expect their employers to more readily acquiesce. That is because employers will have better 
opportunities exploit those high MRP’s as a means of recovering their shares of the costs associated 
with accommodation. Since workers must declare themselves disabled to initiate the bargaining process, 
the plausible result is a positive covariance between random error terms in the earnings and 
disability-reporting equations. 
5.3 Estimates for Self-Reported Disability Based on Personal Income 
As noted above, recognizing that individuals generate income from sources other than wage earnings, 
we repeated the estimations using the log of individuals’ annual personal incomes as the dependent 
variable in the income equation. Estimates for the control variables are largely consistent in both 
magnitude and significance with those in Table II. Possible exceptions are the estimated coefficients of 
education and age in the probit equation, which become smaller in magnitude while remaining strongly 
significant.  
Estimates of the essential parameters in equations (1) and (3),   and  , are presented in the 
second column of Table III. For ease of comparison, in column one the table reproduces the 
corresponding estimates from Table II. Estimates for the full model are omitted from Table 3 for the 
sake of brevity but are available from the authors on request.  
 
Table 3. Additional Estimates of the Basic Model 
Parameter Dependent Variable  
Equation (3): 
Transition to Disabled 
Income Variable in 
Equation (1): 
Wage Personal 
Earnings Income 
Dependent Variable  
Equation (3): 
Transition to SSDI 
Income Variable in 
Equation (1): 
Wage Personal 
Earnings Income 
Error Covariance: ˆ  
 
0.220 0.207 
(3.09) (3.07) 
0.253 0.269 
(1.66) (2.07) 
EARN(t-1): ˆ  
or 
PER_INC(t=1): ˆ  
- 0.488 - 0.540  
(3.61) (3.57) 
0.253 0.269 
(1.66) (2.07) 
  - 0.568 - 0.637  
(1.97) (2.16) 
* Figures in parentheses are absolute t statistics.  
** Specifications of the earnings/income equations are identical to those in Table Full results are not 
reported here. 
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The estimated covariance is positive, again indicating positive latent selection ( ˆ = 0.207), and it 
remains significant ( ˆt = 3.07). The income coefficient remains negative and significant, again 
indicating negative selection with respect to measured personal income (ˆ  = - 0.540; | 57.3|ˆ t ). 
Thus the principal inferences in Table II, positive latent selection and negative selection based on 
income, are robust with respect to the use of personal income instead of the more narrowly defined 
wage earnings. 
5.4 Additional Estimates: Transition to SSDI 
It is common in the literature to define disability in terms of what individuals self-report to surveys or 
other data sources. To narrow that definition, we estimated the model with the dependent variable in the 
probit model defined as one if the individual transitions from zero SSDI income to positive SSDI 
income. This poses an empirical challenge, since the relative rarity of SSDI onset significantly reduces 
sample variation on the left hand side of the probit equation. In our sample, the proportion of 
individuals who self-report disability between periods t-1 and t is 0.029, whereas the proportion who 
transition from zero to positive SSDI income is 0.0004. The consequence of this decrease in variation 
in the dependent variable of the probit model is a loss of precision in the parameter estimates. That is 
borne out in the maximum likelihood estimates of the model when it is estimated with the more 
narrowly defined dependent variable. Estimated coefficients of the control variables, not presented here 
for sake of brevity but available from the authors on request, are less precise and in many cases not 
significantly different from zero. Yet, estimates of the self selection parameters remain significant, or 
nearly so, and they are similar in magnitude to their counterparts from the model based on self-reported 
disability. Those estimates are presented in the third and fourth columns of Table III. Column three is 
based on wage earnings as the measure of income, while column four is based on personal income. In 
both cases, the results continue to lend general support to this paper’s central hypotheses: disability 
onset tends to be negatively selective in terms of measured earnings or income and positively selective 
in terms of unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
5.5 The Mitigating Role of Labor Force Attachment 
One way to test the robustness of these estimates is to account directly for the extent of individuals’ 
labor force attachments in the initial (nondisabled) period. Workers who anticipate onset of disabilities, 
due perhaps to developing adverse health conditions, are likely to be characterized by reduced work 
commitments in periods leading up to the decision to self-report. Thus we might expect that individuals 
who report more work hours in the initial period are less inclined to report disabilities in the second 
period. Consequently, the measures of self selection in our model are expected to be of less import if 
the model is augmented to include a measure of initial work hours. To test this possibility, we estimated 
the model in equations (1) and (3) after adding a measure of usual hours worked to the earnings 
equation.  
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Table IV presents estimates of the self selection parameters,  and  , corresponding to both 
definitions of first-period income and for both self-reported disability and onset of SSDI receipt. For 
the sake of brevity, full estimates of the earnings and probit equations are not reported in the table but 
are available on request. As expected, the estimated self selection parameters decline in magnitude and 
significance. This mediating effect of hours worked suggests that a substantial amount of what first 
appears to be unmeasured self selection, captured here by the parameter  , manifests itself through 
individuals’ decisions to supply hours to the labor market. Interestingly, however, the effect of 
measured income on self-reported disability remains negative and significant at less than the ten 
percent level ( 161.0ˆ Wage with ;68.1ˆ t  and 186.0ˆ _ IncomePersonal  with 
69.1ˆ t ). Our interpretation of this result is that two individuals who are observationally similar 
during period one, including their respective hours worked, can still be distinguished on the basis of 
income; those with higher incomes are less likely to report disabilities and/or initiate receipt SSDI 
income. 
 
Table 4. Additional Estimates: Hours Worked in the Income Equation 
Parameter Dependent Variable  
Equation (3): 
Transition to Disabled 
Income Variable in 
Equation (1): 
Wage Personal 
Earnings Income 
Dependent Variable  
Equation (3): 
Transition to SSDI 
Income Variable in 
Equation (1): 
Wage Personal 
Earnings Income 
Error Covariance: ˆ  0.046 0.047 
(0.94) (1.00) 
0.106 0.143 
(1.00) (1.41) 
EARN(t-1): ˆ  
or 
PER_INC(t=1): ˆ  
- 0.161 - 0.186  
(1.68) (1.69) 
- 0.295 - 0.355  
(1.40) (1.50) 
* Figures in parentheses are absolute t statistics.  
** Specifications of the earnings/income equations are identical to those in Table Full results are not 
reported here. 
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
In the voluminous literature on disability and the labor market, numerous researchers have focused 
attention on the effects disability on outcomes such as income or earnings. A smaller literature has 
investigated the reverse phenomenon, namely the effect of income on reported disability. In the latter 
studies, it has been customary to treat income variables as exogenous or predetermined. Moreover, the 
literature has devoted far less attention to the phenomenon of latent selection into disabled status. This 
paper departs from that tradition in both respects. Treating annual earnings or, alternatively, annual 
personal income as jointly determined with disability outcomes, it offers evidence of negative overt 
selection: high earning men appear less prone to report themselves as disabled, a conclusion that is 
sustained when disability is defined strictly in terms of receipt of public disability insurance income. In 
addition, we estimate the earnings/income effect in the context of a model that controls for selection on 
the basis of unobserved characteristics. The latent selection inference is of interest in its own right, 
suggesting that men who are strong earners in the latent dimension are more prone to report themselves 
as disabled. 
We reconcile these opposing effects by appealing to the argument that working individuals who possess 
latent strengths in earnings will tend to be in advantageous bargaining positions with their employers in 
seeking accommodation under the requirements of the ADA. These workers have more to gain from 
accommodation, and hence see it in their self interest to report themselves as disabled in order to 
become eligible for the ADA’s mandates. Since workers must of course be disabled to initiate the 
bargaining process, the plausible result is a positive covariance between random error terms in the 
earnings and disability-reporting equations.  
An important additional finding in this study is the mediating role of labor force attachments. When the 
model controls for workers who are engaged in relatively greater hours worked during the initial period, 
the evidence for latent self selection is diminished. Even in that case, however, the evidence remains 
suggestive of the direct negative effect of wages or income on reported disability. 
This study is the first in the disability literature to incorporate both phenomena in one model, which we 
argue is an important step in understanding choices made in the disabled population. The evidence 
presented here invites additional research. An important limitation of this study is its (necessary) 
reliance on a two year time frame for observing and measuring disability. In addition, this study is 
limited to earnings and disability outcomes for men who are initially employed and thus able to furnish 
data on earnings and income. Although it would be useful to extend the analysis to females and 
nonworkers, that is complicated by the well known empirical challenge of self selection among 
individuals with weaker attachments to the labor force (Heckman, 1979). Thus, in the context of our 
model, employment decisions by women and male non-workers add another dimension of endogenous 
selection that has to be addressed in the likelihood function (6), a task that is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Another useful but challenging extension would be to include single men in the sample and 
model joint changes in status with respect to both marriage and disability, as we noted in Section IV. 
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Another shortcoming is the absence in our data of variables that are thought to be antecedents to 
disability, such as health conditions and preexisting impairments that are present before individuals 
enter the sample. To the extent that these precursors are reflective of and proxies for unmeasured 
attributes of individuals, our model addresses them by explicit parameterization of latent selection in 
the model. As future research evolves, this study points to the importance of addressing both 
dimensions of the transition to disabled status, an issue that is of undeniable importance for public 
policy in the United States.  
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7. This is adapted from Hausman and Wise (1979). 
8. An extended discussion of approaches to a variety of program evaluation models, including 
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